

El Salvador Strategy Flash

Yesterday, El Salvador announced the results of the tender offer for its Eurobonds maturing in 2025, 2027 and 2029.

El Salvador announced the results of its tender offer

Yesterday, El Salvador announced the results of the tender offer for its Eurobonds maturing in 2025, 2027 and 2029. The repurchase totaled nearly USD487mn, roughly half of the raised funds in last week’s issuance, where the country was able to collect nearly USD1bn in order to finance the bonds’ buyback. The size of the repurchase was significant, and the aggressive buyback slightly exceeded market expectations, as did the tenders, which totaled USD946mn, as investors deemed the proposal attractive. Still, given the very tight premiums and close-to-par prices, the savings of the LMO were minimal, amounting to USD29mn (USD23.6mn in principal, and USD5.4mn in interest), which pale in comparison to the massive benefits the 2022 repurchases yielded. As expected, the administration prioritized repurchasing the bond maturing in 2025, even if it was the bond that would grant the least savings. Therefore, the administration accepted 100% of the tendered amount, effectively repurchasing USD248.4mn of the 2025s. This generated a measly USD2.27mn savings in principal and interest payments. Next, regarding the 2027s the government accepted USD166.9mn of the USD407.6mn tenders received, which in turn yielded the most savings, amounting to USD17.65mn. Finally, the 2029s, which were dead last in the administration’s priority list, received USD290mn in tenders, of which only USD71.6mn were accepted, shaving USD9.14mn from the government’s payment profile going forward. All in all, the repurchase offer generated a 6% ROI for the country and significantly cleared the short-term payment schedule for the Eurobond curve. However, this came at a high associated cost, as last week’s issuance came in at a 12% interest rate, factoring in the 9.25% coupon and the discounted purchase price, doubling the return of the bond repurchase, in addition to heavily loading the medium term maturity schedule. For additional information on the aftermath of last week’s events, please click [here](#).

Figure 1: The administration’s repurchase totaled USD487mn

	Amount issued (USDmn)	Amount outstanding (USDmn)	Repurchase offer price (per 1000 nominals)	Tendered Amount (USDmn)	Repurchased Amount (USDmn)	% of offers accepted	New Amount Outstanding	Principal savings (USDmn)	Interest savings (USDmn)	Total savings (USDmn)
ELSALV25	800	348	991.25	248.4	248.4	100.0%	99.6	2.17	0.1	2.27
ELSALV27	800	800	910	407.6	166.9	41.0%	633.1	15.02	2.63	17.65
ELSALV29	601	601	910	290.0	71.6	24.7%	529.4	6.44	2.7	9.14

Source: TPCG Research based on TPCG Trading Desk


Looking at both phases of the LMO, it is clear that it was successful in clearing the short-term payment schedule of the Eurobond curve, albeit paying a high financing cost for additional funding, which compounds with a steeper payment profile, which is now heavily

Looking at both phases of the LMO, it is clear that it was successful in clearing the short-term payment schedule of the Eurobond curve, albeit paying a high financing cost for additional funding, which compounds with a steeper payment profile, which is now heavily loaded in the 2028-2030 period. Taking a look at the change in the maturity schedule after both the issuance and the repurchase, the results showcase that El Salvador will pay a high price for punting maturities down the field. For the 2024-27 period, the results of the operation look positive, as the total maturity profile compressed by around -USD63mn, which means that, for said years, the LMO yielded a reduction in payments stemming from the Eurobond curve. This drop comes

loaded in the 2028-2030 period.

mostly on the back of the cut in principal payments of the 2025 and 2027 bonds, which outweigh the increased interest burden caused by the new 2030s in 2024 and 2026. However, this positive contribution, even if slight, is massively outweighed by the spike in maturities caused by the 2030 issuance. For the 2028 to 2030 period, payments exhibit an increase of USD1.1bn, resulting from the sinking and interest payments of the 2030's. All in all, even factoring in the repurchases, this LMO loaded the Salvadoran payment profile by nearly USD1.04bn. While this assures the payment of the 2025s, which had their amount outstanding reduced to a measly USD99mn and is positive for the payment of the 2027s, it is clearly negative for the 2029s as it will now have to compete with the 2030s' sinkings, and any possible IMF payments, given the country enters an agreement with the fund. Even with a more aggressive repurchase than expected the success of the operation hinges on the administration's behavior going forward. While both the burden and shape of the new payment profile suggest a harder time for El Salvador in the medium term, the potential result of the gamble hinges on the administration's policy choices going forward, as there are some scenarios where the move proves beneficial. While an IMF deal seems a clear answer to the increase in maturities, it does not look as clear-cut as initially envisaged. Even if it would provide cash to pay for the early maturities, the payments of the program are bound to enter in direct competition with the Eurobond sinkings, and being senior to them, represent a threat to investors, rather than a relief, especially once the initial aid is spent, as we have discussed in previous pieces. To catalog the operation as a success, the administration must maintain its course, resume fiscal discipline, and invigorate fundamentals, so as to retain the main asset it has gained in the LMO, market access. If the country continues exhibiting a robust primary surplus and uses its remaining financing sources wisely, then it will have the recently reopened market access to refinance its maturities. However, if it does not, this issue will surely brew additional trouble for the country. While Mr. Bukele's character showcases that he does not shy away from high-risk high-reward scenarios, this time the reward for making such a gamble is not as apparent, or as bountiful as in recent history, shrouding the results of the operation in uncertainty.

Figure 2: The LMO cleared short term maturities, albeit at a hefty price



Source: TPCG Research based on TPCG Trading Desk

TPCG Analysts & Staff

Research

Juan Manuel Pazos	Chief Economist	jmpazos@tpcgco.com
Paula La Greca	Corporate Research Analyst	plagreca@tpcgco.com
Santiago Resico	Economist	sresico@tpcgco.com
Camila Sanchez Lauria	Research Analyst	csanchezlauria@tpcgco.com

Sales & Trading

Juan Manuel Truppia	Head of Sales & Trading	jmtruppia@tpcgco.com
----------------------------	------------------------------------	-----------------------------

Institutional Sales

Lucia Rodriguez Pardina	S&T Director	lrodriguezpardina@tpcgco.com
Agustina Guadalupe	Sales	aguadalupe@tpcgco.com
Maria Pilar Hurtado	Sales	mhurtado@tpcgco.com
Juan Ignacio Vergara	Sales	jivergara@tpcgco.com
Santiago Baibiene	Sales	sbaibiene@tpcgco.com
Pedro Nollmann	Sales	pnollmann@tpcgco.com
María Ruiz de Castroviejo Salas	Sales	mruidecastroviejo@tpcgco.com
Santiago Jauregui	Sales	sjauregui@tpcgco.com
Victoria Faynbloch	Desk Analyst	vfaynbloch@tpcgco.com

Trading

Felipe Freire	Trader	ffreire@tpcgco.com
Homero Fernandez Bianco	Trader	hfbianco@tpcgco.com
Andres Robertson	Trader	arobertson@tpcgco.com

Corporate Finance

José Ramos	Head of Corporate Finance	jramos@tpcgco.com
-------------------	----------------------------------	--------------------------

Corporate Sales

Camila Martinez	Corporate Sales Director	cmartinez@tpcgco.com
Fernando Depierre	Corporate Sales	fdepierre@tpcgco.com
Sol Silvestrini	Corporate Sales	ssilvestrini@tpcgco.com
Nicolas Iglesias	Corporate Sales	niglesias@tpcgco.com

Capital markets

Nicolás Alperín	DCM	nalperin@tpcgco.com
-----------------	-----	---------------------

Wealth Management

Josefina Guerrero	Private Wealth Management Specialist	jguerrero@tpcgco.com
-------------------	--------------------------------------	----------------------

Important Disclaimer

The document, and the information, opinions, estimates and recommendations expressed herein, have been prepared by TPCG Valores SAU to provide its customers with general information regarding the date of issue of the report and are subject to changes without prior notice. TPCG Valores SAU is not liable for giving notice of such changes or for updating the contents hereof. The document and its contents do not constitute an offer, invitation or solicitation to purchase or subscribe to any securities or other instruments, or to undertake or divest investments. Neither shall the document nor its contents form the basis of any contract, commitment or decision of any kind.

Investors who have access to the document should be aware that the securities, instruments or investments to which it refers may not be appropriate for them due to their specific investment goals, financial positions or risk profiles, as these have not been taken into account to prepare the report. Therefore, investors should make their own investment decisions considering the said circumstances and obtain such specialized advice as may be necessary.

The contents of the document are based upon information available to the public that has been obtained from sources considered to be reliable. However, such information has not been independently verified by TPCG Valores SAU, and therefore no warranty, either express or implicit, is given regarding its accuracy, integrity or correctness. TPCG Valores SAU accepts no liability of any type for any direct or indirect losses arising from the use of the document or its contents. Investors should note that the past performance of securities or instruments or the historical results of investments do not guarantee future performance. The market prices of securities or instruments or the results of investments could fluctuate against the interests of investors. Investors should be aware that they could even face a loss of their investment.

Transactions in futures, options and securities or high-yield securities can involve high risks and are not appropriate for every investor. Indeed, in the case of some investments, the potential losses may exceed the amount of initial investment and, in such circumstances; investors may be required to pay more money to support those losses. Thus, before undertaking any transaction with these instruments, investors should be aware of their operation, as well as the rights, liabilities and risks implied by the same and the underlying stocks. Investors should also be aware that secondary markets for the said instruments may be limited or even not exist.

TPCG Valores SAU and/or any of its affiliates, as well as their respective directors, executives and employees, may have a position in any of the securities or instruments referred to, directly or indirectly, in the document, or in any other related thereto; they may trade for their own account or for third-party account in those securities, provide consulting or other services to the issuer of the aforementioned securities or instruments or to companies related thereto or to their shareholders, executives or employees, or may have interests or perform transactions in those securities or instruments or related investments before or after the publication of the report, to the extent permitted by the applicable law.

TPCG Valores SAU or any of its affiliates' salespeople, traders and other professionals may provide oral or written market Commentary or trading strategies to its clients that reflect opinions that are contrary to the opinions expressed herein. Furthermore, TPCG Valores SAU, or any of its affiliates' proprietary trading and investing businesses, may make investment decisions that are inconsistent with the recommendations expressed herein.

No part of the document may be (i) copied, photocopied or duplicated by any other form or means (ii) redistributed or (iii) quoted without the prior written consent of TPCG Valores SAU. No part of the report may be copied, conveyed, distributed or furnished to any person or entity in any country (or persons or entities in the same) in which its distribution is prohibited by law. Failure to comply with these restrictions may breach the laws of the relevant jurisdiction.

For U.S. persons only

This report is a product of TPCG, which is the employer of the research analyst(s) who has prepared the informative report. The research analyst(s) preparing this report is/are resident(s) outside the United States (U.S.) and is/are not associated person(s) of any U.S. regulated broker-dealer and therefore the analyst(s) is/are not subject to supervision by a U.S. broker-dealer and is/are not required to satisfy the regulatory licensing requirements of FINRA or required to otherwise comply with U.S. rules or regulations.

This report is intended for distribution by TPCG only to U.S. Institutional Investors and Major U.S. Institutional Investors, as defined by Rule 15a-6(b)(4) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Act, 1934 (the Exchange Act) and interpretations thereof by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in reliance on Rule 15a 6(a)(2). If the recipient of this report is not a US Institutional Investors nor a Major U.S. Institutional Investor, as specified above, then he should not act upon this report and return it to the sender. Further, this report may not be copied, duplicated and/or transmitted to any U.S. person, which is not a U.S. Institutional Investor, nor a Major U.S. Institutional Investor.

In order to comply with the US regulations, our transactions with US Institutional Investors and Major US Institutional Investors are effected through the US-registered broker-dealer Marco Polo Securities Inc. ("Marco Polo"). Transactions in securities discussed in this report should be effected through Marco Polo or another U.S. registered broker dealer.